So Now the New York Times Is Promoting Egalitarianism? Well, ...Not Quite.

But the NYT wonders if it may be time for the plutocracy to PRETEND it is for egalitarianism

The New York Times recently ran a very interesting “guest essay opinion” piece titled,
“Our Solution to the Crisis of Democracy” by professors Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (copied below for your convenience.¹) This article will surprise you because it seems to call for making the United States more economically and politically egalitarian, and for the Democratic Party to break its ties with Big Money and Wall Street and start to really represent the working class. Heady stuff, right?

The title of this remarkable article is an allusion to the book titled The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission written in 1975 and co-authored by Samuel P. Huntington, Professor of Government and Director of the Center For International Affairs at Harvard University [you can read the full text in this PDF file.] Recall that 1975 was when the ruling class was extremely frightened by the challenge to its authority that came to be known as the “radical 60s.” This book was written for the ruling elites of the United States, Europe and Japan in their organization that David Rockefeller created—the Trilateral Commission—who were to meet in Kyoto, Japan to discuss this book’s Report, the proposals of which the elite did in fact implement.

The recent New York Times article, “Our Solution to the Crisis of Democracy,” that I will discuss shortly is, in its purpose if not recommendations, exactly like the earlier The Crisis of Democracy book written in 1975 for the Trilateral Commission, namely to advise the ruling billionaire plutocracy how to hold onto its power when there is growing hostility to it by the have-nots. Let’s put the recent NYT article in its proper historical context to understand what it is and what it is not. Here we go.

It turns out that it is not easy for a ruling billionaire plutocracy to hold onto power.

The “stick” works for a while…

If the plutocracy treats the have-nots like dirt too extremely (the “stick”), then it works for a while. But eventually the have-nots rise up like they did in the 1930s Great Depression with a damn-near revolutionary movement that I describe in some detail here, one single paragraph of which, for example, reads:

The Los Angeles Times wrote: "The situation in San Francisco is not correctly described by the phrase 'general strike.' What is actually in progress there is an insurrection, a Communist-inspired and led revolt against organized government. There is but one thing to be done--put down the revolt with any force necessary." FDR's National Recovery Administration chief, General Hugh S. Johnson, went to San Francisco and declared the general strike a "menace to the government" and a "civil war."

but then one needs to use a “carrot”

But, as FDR knew full well (and persuaded his ruling class friends), when the working class rises up as it did in the 1930s, it becomes necessary for the ruling plutocracy to adopt a new method of social control, to replace the “stick” with a “carrot,” which FDR did with the New Deal.² The New Deal was designed to persuade American workers that revolution was not necessary because the capitalist class was going to change and make life better for workers; all one had to do was vote Democratic Party.

But after using the “carrot” the stick is again necessary

The problem is that the New Deal and the similar LBJ post World War II “War on Poverty” created rising expectations among the working class have-nots. The radical upheavals in the United States in the 1960s occurred when unemployment was extremely low and economic equality was at an all time high (i.e., economic inequality was at an all-time low.) The have-nots felt more secure and confident than ever now and this is why they set their sights not only on bare survival but on making society more equal and just.

As the 1975 “Crisis of Democracy” report noted (and as I discuss in detail here):

"The essence of the democratic surge of the 1960s was a general challenge to existing systems of authority, public and private," marked by a "sharp increase in political consciousness, political participation, and commitment to egalitarian and democratic values." [The rulers called this “rising expectations.”]

What especially frightened the elite was the fact that, as Huntington wrote in his report,

"In recent years, the operations of the democratic process do indeed appear to have generated a breakdown of traditional means of social control, a de-legitimation of political and other forms of authority... The late sixties have been a major turning point."

The Report concluded:

"Al Smith once remarked that 'the only cure for the evils of democracy is more democracy.' Our analysis suggests that applying that cure at the present time could well be adding fuel to the flames. Instead, some of the problems of governance in the United States stem from an excess of democracy... Needed, instead, is a greater degree of moderation of democracy."

"A Greater Degree of Moderation of Democracy"!! [i.e., the “stick”]

Corporate leaders in 1975 abandoned the old method of social control embodied in the New Deal and the Great Society and began relying instead on a fundamentally different, "get tough," strategy designed to strengthen corporate power over people by making them less secure. This new strategy motivates corporate leaders' new enthusiasm for the "discipline" of the free market, which they use to justify not only market-driven health care (read about this in more detail here)  but downsizing and attacks on the social safety net.​

Following the radical 60s the ruling class implemented a new pattern of government and corporate policy initiatives over subsequent decades. These policies all have one thing in common: they strengthen corporate power over people by lowering people's expectations in life, and by reducing their economic, social, and emotional security.

These policies include corporate downsizing and the "temping" of jobs; the elimination of the "family wage," so that now both parents have to work full-time and have less time with their children; drastic cuts in the social safety net of welfare and related assistance; the introduction of pension plans based on individualized investments that leave each older person to his or her own fate; and the use of high stakes tests in public elementary and secondary schools to subject children to the same stress and insecurity that their parents face on the job. In the workplace, employers have adopted anti-worker tactics that had not been used since the early 1930s, most notably firing striking workers and hiring permanent replacements, as President Reagan did during the air traffic controllers' strike.

But then, guess what? The “carrot” is once again necessary.

The recent New York Times “Our Crisis of Democracy” article is, not that surprisingly now if one sees the historical pattern, calling once again for the use of a “carrot.” This explains its “egalitarian” rhetoric.

But if you read the article carefully you will note that professors Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson never say or even hint at the following actual egalitarian ideas:

• There should not be some rich and some poor (which is what egalitarianism actually means, (as discussed here.)

• The economy should be based not on buying and selling things, and not on the wage system, but on the principle, “From each according to reasonable ability, to each according to need or reasonable desire with scarce things equitably rationed according to need” (as discussed here.)

• A government is not legitimate just because it is elected (as discussed here), but only if it shapes society by the egalitarian values of the vast majority and the way to ensure it does this is by having SOVEREIGN local assemblies of egalitarians as discussed here.

• Egalitarian governments do NOT wage unjust wars, in contrast to the U.S. government, which has done so for centuries as discussed here and here and an egalitarian government does not have (never mind use) nuclear weapons, as discussed here.

The professors omit—avoid like the plague!—actual egalitarian ideas because their aim is absolutely not to make the United States an egalitarian society but rather to make us, the have-nots, believe that our billionaire plutocracy rulers are going to make it be such a society. Just as FDR wanted American workers to believe that the capitalists who treated the have-nots like dirt then (and who still treat the have-nots like dirt today) intended to stop doing that—if only the workers voted Democratic Party.

The Moral of this Story​

The ruling class needs to persuade us, the have-nots, that revolution is not necessary to prevent the billionaire plutocracy from treating us like dirt and to prevent the plutocracy from warmongering against bogeyman enemies to control us. The problem is not that we are weak and the ruling class is strong. Indeed, the ruling class is FRIGHTENED of our strength. This is why the ruling class must keep switching back and forth between using the “carrot” or the “stick.”

By the way, the ruling class has been using celebrity intellectuals to control the have-nots for a long time, by channeling us to aim for a pseudo-egalitarianism.

One that comes to mind is Robert Reich, who (as I have written about here) specializes in telling the have-nots that their desire to have a more equal society means they are for “Equal Opportunity” on a “level playing field” (which, contrary to egalitarianism, means an equal opportunity for a few to get much richer than the many, competing on a “level playing field” to see who will be a winner and who will be a loser.)

Another one is Jeffrey Sachs about whom I have written here.

We CAN remove the rich from power. It requires building an egalitarian revolutionary movement with that explicit goal. Read here how YOU can help build this movement.

Thank you to Chuck F. for nudging me to write this piece. :)

1. OPINION

GUEST ESSAY

Our Solution to the Crisis of Democracy

July 19, 2024

Credit...Millie von Platen

By Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson

Dr. Acemoglu is a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dr. Robinson is a professor at the University of Chicago.

Remember the 1990s, when everybody thought liberal democracy was the only game in town and the end of history was upon us?

The near assassination of former President Donald Trump has buttressed, instead, a feeling that crisis is upon us. Both Democrats and Republicans hold dangerously unfavorable opinions of each other. Trust in institutions is decaying. According to the most recent Gallup poll, only 30 percent of Americans said they had quite a lot or a great deal of confidence in the Supreme Court, fewer had confidence in the presidency, and a measly 9 percent had quite a lot or a great deal of confidence in Congress. Trust in public schools, banks, large firms, the news media and even religious organizations has similarly plummeted since the 1970s.

Americans also support democracy at much lower levels than they used to, and politics appears a zero-sum game to people on both sides of the great divide. Add to this the flare-up of political violence, and the sense of imminent danger is intensified.

But do not despair — yet. There are solutions, if we are bold enough to grasp them. We need a new democratic social contract that people can believe in, which is most likely to come from the Democratic Party. Such a proposal must start with a commitment to more pro-worker policies. It must involve a believable manifesto that moves away from the party’s ties with global business, including the tech sector, and a clear, workable plan of how economic growth and low inequality can be combined. It must include a commitment to close the cultural chasm that has opened between the Democratic Party and many working-class Americans. These are among the root causes of our discontent, and they must be addressed.

If Americans fail to rise to the challenge, history has plenty of examples that ought to alarm us. In an environment in which institutions cannot mediate disagreement, there is a danger that a spark can ignite a cycle of extremism. There was a rise in political violence in Germany before the Nazis took power, with right-wing paramilitaries killing opponents and Communists responding in kind. The situation in Italy, with violence led by Mussolini’s black shirts, was no different. In Japan, too, political violence spiked before the military took control in the 1930s.

To diagnose and redress democracy’s problems, we need to understand what made it work in the past and what ails it today. This isn’t just an American phenomenon. Democracy is in crisis around the world, including in Hungary, Poland, Sweden, India, Turkey, the Philippines and Brazil and across sub-Saharan Africa. These crises appear to be rooted at least in part in a growing belief that democracy has failed to deliver on its promises since the end of the Cold War.

Democracy’s success throughout the 20th century boils down to the presence of political egalitarianism (people have a say in their own lives and in how the country is governed) and economic egalitarianism (the rewards of progress were shared, at least to some degree).

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There is something compelling in political egalitarianism, at least in theory: Nobody is your superior, and you have a say in how society is organized. Democracy is appealing because it enshrines the idea of rule by the people. Indeed, democratic representation has historically increased from the bottom up — when disenfranchised groups demanded and received a voice in political affairs.

Democracy isn’t just rule by the people, however; it was also rule for the people. Democracy delivered what people wanted — wage growth, good jobs, low unemployment, education and reasonable public services. John Betjeman, the one-time British poet laureate, captured the essence of the democratic social contract when he wrote that his nation stands for “democracy and proper drains.”

During the decades following World War II, the social contract stood and democracy brought some degree of economic egalitarianism, too. Prosperity appeared to be on the path to becoming truly shared in most of the world’s democracies — even if discrimination against some groups, including minorities and women, continued, especially in the United States. Services ranging from infrastructure to health, education, safety and social insurance expanded rapidly.

This economic egalitarianism has been lost over the past four decades, most visibly in the United States, where shared prosperity has all but ceased. Inequality soared starting around 1980. It wasn’t simply that some people were benefiting more from economic growth than others. While earnings of well-educated Americans rose rapidly, workers without college degrees, especially men, saw their inflation-adjusted incomes decline as they watched their jobs in offices and on factory floors get automated by computers and robots and relocated to countries with low wages.

A giant wave of imports from China shut factories and businesses. The layoffs often brought a deep and prolonged recession to whole communities. For all practical purposes, only about half of the American population has benefited from economic growth since the early 1980s.

The malaise is not just economic. Many of the same communities have also suffered rising crime and single parenthood rates and alcohol and opioid consumption. Strikingly, the trend toward greater life expectancy and greater health that had been a near constant since the beginning of the 20th century broke down as well.

This was made more jarring because the reversal of progress toward shared prosperity coincided with a sense that people had lost much of their influence over politics. Of course, political elites set the agenda in any democracy, and there have always been impediments to representation and accountability in the United States. Nevertheless, when the political scientist Robert Dahl set out to investigate who governs local politics in New Haven in the 1950s, the answer wasn’t an established party or a well-defined elite. Rather, he concluded that the nature of power was pluralistic, and that the involvement of regular people in politics was key for the governance of the city, and this appeared to be true beyond New Haven as well.

This stands in stark contrast to how most Americans feel today. From the vantage point of those in depressed communities, politicians stood idle as their good jobs got destroyed and the promise of economic dynamism came to nothing. The sense that politicians serve multinational corporations, wealthy donors or global elites intensified in many corners of the country.

Myriad policies, including financial deregulation and globalization, were presented to voters as the consensus recommendations of experts. After tallying the cost of Chinese exports and the 2008 financial meltdown, many started seeing this not as expert policymaking but as the wrong kind of technocracy.

It didn’t help that many Americans felt (and were often told) that there was a culture war and that in this war, they were on a different side from most politicians, business leaders and the majority of the educated, managerial class. It was a small step to conclude that there wasn’t much left of rule by the people or rule for the people.

Yet democracy isn’t dead. Even political violence is not proof that democratic institutions are coming undone. The 1960s witnessed the assassinations of John F. Kennedy, Martin Luther King Jr. and Robert Kennedy, most prominently, and the 1970s saw bombings and terrorist activities by the Weather Underground and other extremist cells. In the 1990s, at a high point of the nation’s trust in democracy, Timothy McVeigh killed 168 people in Oklahoma City.

It is also true that democracy is still the best game in town, even if not the only one. Our research shows that democracies achieve faster economic growth than do autocratic regimes, and they do so by investing in people — by supporting more education and better health care, especially for the poorer segments of society. When democracy delivers such outcomes, it increases support from the citizenry.

Still, it is clear that democratic institutions and the political parties that are their standard-bearers need to regain a greater legitimacy. And neither better economic performance nor resilience in the face of political violence will be sufficient.

When monarchies ruled, they didn’t do so because they delivered good economic outcomes. Nor did they rule because they controlled all the weapons. They had an elaborate justification for their legitimacy. In early modern England, it was the “divine right of kings.” In China, it was the “mandate of heaven.”

It’s not just autocratic regimes that rely on such philosophies. The move toward greater popular participation also required legitimation and a new social contract. In England, that was articulated by philosophers such as John Locke, who provided the foundation of “popular sovereignty.” Democracy’s ascendance in the 20th century was predicated on its universality — that it would work equally well everywhere around the world, from Spain, Portugal and Greece, to Latin America, Eastern Europe and Africa.

That trust is largely lost. Center-left parties, which used to get a significant fraction of their votes from blue-collar workers and citizens without college degrees, now increasingly rely on votes (and money) from college graduates, professionals and managers.

That is all the more so in the United States, where the Democratic Party has gradually become associated with the preferences of the well-educated and urban voters. Democratic politicians often shy away from policies such as job guarantee programs, trade protection and stronger unions. (The party still favors redistribution, but at least until the Biden administration, its agenda was to achieve this redistribution predominantly through taxation and welfare programs, without interfering with the market.)

Center-left parties need to lead the way in breaking this mold. This must start by severing ties with tech billionaires, pharmaceutical giants and Wall Street tycoons. It is difficult to believe that a party that gets funding and ideas from the very wealthy will work hard for the well-being of the most disadvantaged. They must promote to leadership people with a background in manual work and from different educational paths. One visible and symbolic way of achieving this is to reserve a fraction of candidacies and leadership positions for individuals without a college degree. Similar strategies have been successfully used by Swedish social democrats and local governments in India.

Where the center-left leads, the center-right should follow. In the United States, Republicans have already made inroads with working-class voters, and a stronger commitment from Democrats can push the G.O.P. in a more pro-worker direction, too. Campaign-finance reform would help, including public money for candidates that refuse support from big donors. There is also a case for introducing proportional representation voting, which can allow new parties to take up the mantle of working-class causes if the two major parties cannot get their act together. This could start at the local level, without the need for a constitutional amendment.

Center-left parties must also rekindle political egalitarianism, and this cannot be done unless they walk back from the culture wars. It is commendable that the center-left has defended and given voice to some of the most disadvantaged groups in society, including minorities and immigrants. They must also find a way of articulating these ideas in a way that is acceptable to a working-class base. Humanitarian relief for refugees can appeal more to voters when combined with strong security at the border.

Democracy does not need to follow a majoritarian opinion on every topic, but it cannot sideline the views of the majority of the population, even on divisive subjects such as immigration.

Donald Trump is likely to become more popular after the attempt against his life. Yet a politician whose most distinctive policy achievement is tax cuts that favor the rich cannot be a true representative of the working people. His track record of polarizing, violent rhetoric, personalizing power and eroding institutional checks makes it clear that a second Trump term would significantly weaken and even fundamentally threaten democratic institutions. Some pundits are as worried about his newly anointed running mate, Senator JD Vance, as they are about Mr. Trump.

The silver lining here is that Mr. Vance’s unabashed economic populism and Mr. Trump’s appeal to the working class may force a deeper soul-searching among the Democrats. If they take serious steps to reinvent themselves as the party of the working people, Mr. Trump may have inadvertently put democracy toward a better path.

2. “I want to save our system, the capitalistic system,” FDR told an emissary of the archconservative newspaper publisher William Randolph Hearst. To do so, Roosevelt said, “it may be necessary to throw to the wolves the forty-six men who are reported to have incomes in excess of one million dollars a year.” [Read the source here.]​