Israel Minister Warns Iran Now Legitimate Target Because It Uses Hamas (which Israel Funds) as a Proxy Just As the Soviet Union (which the U.S. Armed) Used Cuba as a Proxy in the 1962 Missile Crisis
Details regarding what is in parentheses in the title are below
Read the full Newsbreak article here. It reports a statement by the minister that is more ironical than he realizes:
“My recommendation is to adopt the strategy that President Kennedy used in the Cuban missile crisis,” Israel’s economy minister said, referring to Kennedy’s policy “to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba … an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union.”
Oh, the irony!
Israeli Minister Barkat may not realize it, but he has just made the most ironic statement of, perhaps, the 21st century. Here’s why.
FACT #1. Israel has for decades been funding Hamas and working to keep it in power. This is indisputable and I prove it (and explain the “why” of it also) here.
FACT #2. The United States armed the Soviet Union during the Cold War, as I prove and explain the “why” of here in an article that includes the following about how the U.S. enabled the Soviet Union to bring its missiles to Cuba:
State Department Approval for the Soviet Vessels That Carried Missiles to Cuba
"The Poltava-class of Soviet merchant vessels, which is equipped with special hatches for the purpose, was used to carry missiles to Cuba in 1962. The main engines for the first two vessels in this class were manufactured by Burmeister & Wain in Copenhagen. Engines for the remaining eighteen ships in the class came from the Bryansk plant in the Soviet Union. Both the Danish and the Bryansk engines were built to the same specification: 740 millimeter cylinder diameter and 1,600 millimeter piston stroke. The Danish engines have six cylinders while the Soviet engines have seven cylinders; in all other respects they are identical Burmeister & Wain-design engines. In 1959 the Danish company made a technical-assistance agreement with the Soviets for manufacture of large marine diesels, not manufactured in the USSR at that time, and the U.S State Department, through CoCom [read footnote * below for what CoCom was and how the Defense Department opposed the State Department approval], approved the export of this technology as nonstrategic. As any member of CoCom has veto power, objection by the State Department representatives would have effectively blocked the agreement.
"The Poltava-class ships were used to carry Soviet missiles to Cuba in 1962. The first Poltava engines were manufactured in Denmark in 1959 and the ships entered service in 1962, only a few months before they were used for transporting missiles to Cuba. In other words, the first operational use of these diesel engines--approved by State as nonstrategic--was in a challenge to the United States which brought us to the brink of nuclear war. The Poltava-class ships have extra long hatches: eight of 13.6 meters length and 6.2 meters width: ideal for loading medium-range missiles." ...
"In 1962 the U.S. Navy photographed Russian merchant ships unloading missile supplies at the Cuban port of Mariel--then, and now, a Russian naval base in Cuba. These ships included the Dvinogorsk, and 8,000-ton freighter built in Poland on Soviet account with Dutch engines (7,800 bhp Sulzer diesels made by N.V. Werkspoor of Amsterdam). Holland is a NATO ally and again the export of such engines to the USSR is illegal and could have been halted by the State Department.
"When we look closely at the transportation technology used to bring about the most dangerous international crisis in the last decade, we find that the U.S. State Department not only had the knowledge and the capability to stop the transfer but was required by law to ensure that the technology was not passed to the Soviets. In other words, there would have been no Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 if the State Department had followed congressional instructions and carried out the job it is paid to do." [pg. 158-60, this and further page references refer to National Suicide: Military Aid to the Soviet Union, by Antony C. Sutton, New Rochelle, New York: Arlington House 1973]
* "...[A]ny member of the Cocom (Coordinating Committee; the operating arm of the Consultative Group established by NATO and Japan in 1950 to coordinate the export controls of the major industrial nations) group of nations has veto power and that no shipment has ever been made to the Soviet Union without the unanimous approval of all members. Thus, the transfer of Danish maritime technology in 1959 had implicit or explicit State Department approval." [pg. 56]
*The Department of Defense objection was given in testimony by John H. Williams, Staff Director, Industrial Production Equipment Division, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Installations and Logistics, March 2, 1961 in U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Export of Ball Bearing Machines to Russia, Hearings, 87th Congress, 1st session (Washington, 1961), p. 267, which is available online at https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=umn.31951d02120617f;view=1up;seq=3 . Williams stated as follows:
"I hold the position of Staff Director, Industrial Production Equipment Division, in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics. In this capacity, it is one of my functions to act as technical adviser to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) on technical matters relating to the defense position on the export of industrial production equipment. I have been assigned to this function because of my background of many years in the machine-tool trade.
"I would like to start off by outlining the general procedures followed by the Department of Commerce and the Defense Department on requests for export license in the fields of production equipment.
The first time that I hear of such a request is in the form of a telephone inquiry from the Department of Commerce, Office of International Trade (OIT), saying that they have a request for an export license.
"At this point it is first necessary to obtain precise information regarding the equipment by name of manufacturer, model, size, capacity, horsepower, etc. It is also necessary to obtain information about the reported intended use of this equipment in the Communist bloc countries.
"Having obtained this information, it is my responsibility to determine the quantities and types of this equipment that are currently available within the Department of Defense, and, as far as possible, to determine the purpose for which this equipment is currently being utilized or is being held for future requirements.
"Next, an investigation is made to discover if identical or similar machinery is produced in the Communist bloc countries and, if so, in what quantities. This information is available from many sources within DOD and Government, including the Library of Congress.
"After obtaining all this information, I recommend to the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs (ISA), or to his staff as to whether or not the export license should be granted. In most cases all of the information is made available to them in a discussion. They (ISA) act as the spokesman for the Department of Defense at all conferences and meetings where the granting or the denial of an export license is under discussion.
"At many of these conferences, if there is to be any technical discussion relative to the construction and the capabilities of the subject machine, I accompany the ISA member as technical adviser and, when requested by him, address my remarks to the committee.
"In the specific case of the granting of the export license for high-frequency grinders manufactured by Bryant Chucking Grinder, after receiving the request for DOD's opinion from the Department of Commerce, it was determined that all of the machines of this type currently available in the United States were being utilised for the production of bearings utilized in strategic components for military end items. It was also determined from information that was available to us that the Soviets did not produce a machine of this type or one that could be comparable in enabling the production of miniature ball bearings of the tolerances and precision required.
"A further consideration was whether machines of comparable capacity and size can be made available from Western Europe. In this connection, our investigation revealed that none was in production that would meet the specifications that had been established by the Russians for these machines.
"In the light of these considerations it was our opinion that the license should not be granted, and I so reported to ISA.
"ISA, after intensive examination and discussion of the matter, concurred in this opinion and the ISA representative advised against the granting of the Bryant license at several consecutive meetings of the Advisory Committee on Export Policy or its subcommittee. I myself was present at three of these meetings and, according to my recollection, I spoke at two of them, in my capacity as technical advisor, against the granting of the license.
"However, at the conclusion of these meetings, a decision was made to approve the granting of a license for the export of the Bryant machines to the Soviet Union.
"In the latter part of September 1960 the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Supply and Logistics, called me and stated that he had received a complaint relative to the granting of a license for the export of machine tools for the production of precision ball bearings, and he asked if I was familiar with the transaction. When informed that I was, and when I reviewed the circumstances at his request, he instructed me to take immediate action to do whatever was possible to express the dissatisfaction of the Department of Defense and to prevent the shipment, which was then planned for January 1961.
"To accomplish this, a memorandum was written to ISA requesting that a formal protest be written by the Secretary of the Department of Defense to the Secretary of Commerce. Such a letter was prepared and delivered to the Secretary. As a result of this, there were several additional meetings of the Advisory Committee on Export Policy at which all of the circumstances previously discussed were reviewed. In each instance the Department of Defense requested positive information as to where in the U.S.S.R. or in Western Europe machines comparable or satisfactory for the production of miniature precision bearings were currently in production. In each instance, the Department of Defense objected to the shipment of these machines.
"While it was argued in defense of the license that the technical ability to produce such machines existed in other countries, at no point was any firm assurance given or proof adduced that such machines were in fact already in production in other countries.
"In résumé, the following actions were known to me regarding the transaction of this export license:
"(a) I expressed dissatisfaction and suggested that the Department of Defense no concur in the initial request of the Department of Commerce.
(b) The official member of the Department of Defense in this connection concurred and, at a series of meetings of the Advisory Committee on Export Control, spoke against the proposal that an export license be granted.
(c) The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Supply and Logistics, after reviewing some of the circumstances, requested that I do whatever was possible to stop the shipment of these machines.
(d) A letter was transmitted from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of Commerce, approximately November 1, 1960, saying it spoke to the Department of Defense and requesting a further review.
(e) At two meetings where the matter war reviewed, the Department of Defense maintained nonconcurrrence in the shipment of the equipment.
"In such cases, where I am asked for advice on the export of equipment, policy guidance as to whether a license should or should not be approved is confusing. Any clarification in this respect would greatly facilitate and create a uniform handling of such future requests.
"As of this writing I am still convinced that it would be a tragic mistake to ship this equipment."
Please read about the larger context of nations funding or arming their supposed enemies in my “OPPRESSORS NEED BOGEYMAN ENEMIES AND INVENT THEM WHEN NECESSARY, which explains THE ACTUAL VERSUS APPARENT AIMS OF U.S. IMPERIALISM (which is the subject of the sub-section of this article titled "THE ACTUAL, VERSUS APPARENT, AIM OF U.S. IMPERIALISM IS NOT TO WIN THE WAR BUT TO BE AT WAR")
All you have to say is, Where is your EVIDENCE that Iran is using Hamas as a proxy? The USSR was not using Cuba as a proxy, but as a BASE. Kennedy and Kruschchev defused the situation with compromises.